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The purpose of this study is to view the regular officer
retention problem, within the Harlne Corps, as the author sees
it and in quantified forna. To this end representative costs have
been assigned to the various general tasks of procuring and
training a regular officer, and an attempt is made to determine
what portion of these cost3 may have been lost through failure
to retain him on active duty for at least a minimum of twenty
years
•
Since direct cost figures, of the nature desired, are not
readily available at the Marine dorps activities visited by the
author, the cost figures contained herein are not aocurate,
historical costs. They are, however, the author feels,
representative, minimum oosts and are useful, in that light, in
attempting to determine the least investment the American people
have made in gaining a regular Marine officer.
Further, it is recognized that it is not possible, or
even desirable, that the active duty ranks of the Marine Corps
offioer structure be staffed entirely by regular officers. This
study will take no issue with this point. However, since the
Marine Corps regular officer input has been only a small portion
of all officer input it would appear desirable to retain the

2maximum number possible of these accessions.
Again, attention is invited to the fact that the bases
for many of the cost figures were of the author's contrivance*
An attempt has been made clearly to identify these. Additionally,
where possible, every effort is made to insure that oosts, based
on these contrived bases, are understated, rather than overstated
in order to insure that the oosts presented are minimum costs.

k BAlSt HISTOftt OP MARIHS OOEPS OFFICER PROOaHSMSNT1
To understand the regular officer retention problem within
the Marine Corps it is important that we understand the sources of
Marine Corps officers and the manner in which applicants are
obtained from these sources. So this end the following brief
history of Marine Corps officer procurement is offered.
Prom the time the Continental Congress adopted its
resolution creating two Marine battalions and urged that
"particular care be taken that no persons be appointed to office
or enlisted into said battalions, but such as are good seamen, or
so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to
advantage by sea when required, " the Marine Corps has experienoed
varying periods of time in which retention of officers was a
problem.
Beginning with the first post Revolutionary War Commandant,
Lllaa Ward Burroughs, until the outbreak of the Civil iar, the
commandants of the Marine Corps took a personal interest in the
Histbrloa]
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4appointment of officers from oivil life and personally selected
those who were commissioned.
Soon after the outbreak of the Oivil ,<rar, Congress
modified the 2-Iarine Corps system of officer procurement to make
eligible for commission only young men between the ages of twenty
and twenty-five who passed a professional examination drawn up and
administered by the Secretary of the Navy.
In 1882, Congress again modified the system and directed
that the Marine Corps obtain some of its second lieutenants from
the Naval Academy. However, this source proved insufficient, by
itself to meet the expansion needs of the Spanish American war,
and additional officers were commissioned from the ranks and from
civil life.
Here we have the first indications of the simultaneous use
of what has proven to be the three major sources of officer input
to the Marine Corps—the Naval Academy, enlisted ranks, and civil
life. Depending upon the needs of the times, the iMarlne Corps has
continued to use these sources, with varying degrees of emphasis,
up to the present day.
During the emergency brought about by World tfar I, and
our subsequent entry into that war, from 1914 to 1920, the major
source of all officer procurement was the enlisted ranks. Also,
during this time, a program was initiated whioh authorized the
appointment of applicants from civil life to become second
lieutenants in the Marine Corps Reserve. Selected officers from

5this program were allowed to be discharged later and to be
reappointed to the permanent, regular Marine Corps.
The fact that the majority of all officers, during world
War I, were procured from the ranks was the result of a policy
Initiated by Major General George Barnett, Commandant of the
Marine Corps in 1914. His opinion was that the officer corps
should be staffed entirely by graduates of the Saval Academy and
nen from the enlisted ranks. The fact that this policy did not
serve the needs of the Marine Corps did not become obvious until
1921, At that time the Marine Corps was attempting to extricate
itself from its first serious officer shortage problem of the
twentieth century, and was having trouble doing it.
Demobilization after World War I, had left 564 vacancies in the
ranks of the permanent regular officers, emergency action, in the
form of appointing a board to deal with the problera, was necessary,
and it was not until such action was taken that the problem was
solved.
During the 1920*3 the Marine Corps used the same three
general sources of procurement cited above, but modified its
civil source to include only graduates of military colleges and
universities who were reoommended by the presidents of those
institutions. However, the policy initiated by General Barnett
still underlay the actions of the Marine Corps for, when
vacancies in the offioer structure were limited, applicants were
first selected from the Naval Academy, then from the enlisted
ranks, and finally from civil life.
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In 1925» the Marin© Corps Reserve, which had its abortive
introduction to the military scene in 1916, was reemphasized and
a coordinated effort was made to obtain peacetime reserve
officers to staff Marine Corps Reserve companies. These companies
were being established throughout the United States and the Intent
was to staff them with officers who had previous, honorable,
active service in one of the armed forces of the United States,
This attempt proved unsuccessful and led to a revision of the
requirements for obtaining a reserve commission. With this
revision, reserve appointments were offered to graduates of
accredited colleges who were not required to have any prior
military experience.
In 1926, Congress also established the Naval Reserve
Officers Training Corps, of which the Marine Corps Reserve
Officer Training Corps was a small part. The purpose of this
program was to provide the Marine Corp3 with junior officers from
the graduating classes of several selected universities. However,
the pv 1 never proved satisfactory for Marine Corps purposes
and, in 1934, Harlne Corps support, in the form of instructors,
was withdrawn.
In 1935» the Harine Corps initiated the platoon leader's
class program. This program provided college students
commissions as second lieutenants in the Harine Corps Reserve,
upon graduation, after attendance at two summer, six weeks

6training sessions. These sessions were conducted at Quantico,
Virginia, and the students attended as members of the Marine
Oorps Reserve.
With the advent of World War II, the procurement picture
shifted somewhat and various programs, e.g., V-12 and the college
training program, were instituted. These programs were aimed at
procuring college graduates for the officer corps. Also, in
1940, the officer candidate course, a three months course of
instruction open to graduates of accredited colleges, was
initiated at Quantico. This course led to a reserve commission.
With respect to commissioning in the Regular Marine Oorps
the late 1930' s showed an almost complete reversal of General
Barnett's ideas, and the bulk of regular officers were appointed
from civilian sources, whereas very few were appointed from the
ranks
.
During World iar II, input to the officer ranks, both
regular and reserve, was from the Naval Academy, the V-12 program,
the college training program, field commissions, and the officer
candidate classes. Again, the specific source used depended upon
the specific needs of the times but now the emphasis was shifted
to procuring applicants with college training.
After World War II, the Marine Oorps allowed its officer
candidate course, V-12, and college training programs to lapse
and again looked primarily to the Naval Academy, augmented by the
rejuvenated Naval Reserve Officer Training Course, for its
officer input.

7The platoon leader's class was revived on a grand scale,
soon after World War II, and this course became the third major
source of regular and reserve officers. Additionally, commissions
were still tendered outstanding enlisted men and selected
graduates of Air Force and Irmy reserve officer training programs.
v/ith the advent of the Korean conflict a number (500) of
temporary commissions were awarded outstanding master sergeants,
warrant officers, and commissioned warrant officers. Two other
programs were also initiated, at this time, to meet a growing
requirement for specialists and technicians, the warrant officer
program and the limited duty officer program.
Today the Marine Oorps employs, as the sources of most
of its male officers, regular and reserve, the Naval Academy,
the Naval Reserve Officer training program, the platoon leader's
class, the officer candidate course, the meritorious non-
commissioned officer program, selected graduates of Army and Air
Force reserve officer training programs, the limited duty officer
program, the warrant officer program, and the Navy enlisted
scientific education program.
Since the Spanish American War, the Marine Oorps has used,
at varying times, as a source of its permanent, regular officers,
the Naval Academy, the Naval Reserve Officer training corps, and
a system of selection from within its own ranks. This selection
from within has become characteristic of the Marine Oorps and
Involves the augmentation of selected reserve (and in the past,

8temporary) officers forregular, permanent appointments.
for example, and as indicated above, subsequent to world
Var I, demobilization left a total of 564 vacancies in the
strength of the officer corps. In dealing with this problem
selections for permanent commissions were made from among the
temporary officers, both regular and reserve, who had served in
the aotlve Marine dorps during the war, and enlisted men and
warrant officers who had held war-time commissions.
Figure 1 shows the relationship of regular officer
accessions to reserve officer accessions during the period 1952-
1962. This figure deals with accessions making their initial
entry into officer ranks.
Figure 2 gives an illustration of the importance of
augmentation from within during the period 1960-1962.
Since the regulars from other sources, illustrated in
Figure 2, are in part college students who are fulfilling an
active duty requirement incurred as a result of the federal
government subsidizing their education, and sinoe many of these
officers can be expected to leave the active Marine Corps upon
fulfillment of this requirement, the augmentation program, which
deals with officers selecting a career after being exposed to it,
carries a degree of permanence and, therefore, becomes important
in any consideration of the Marine Corps regular officer structure.
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iiaphasla is placed on this point at this time In order
to provide a basis for assumptions and conclusions to be made
later in this study.
Thus, we have seen a brief history of Marine Corps
officer procurement. Now let us consider the scope of the problem
which has arisen from our failure to retain as permanent, regular
officers, a sufficient number of those officers procured.

CHAPT3R II
OFFICER R3U3STI0N PROBL JFII3D
In this study, when we speak of a regular officer
retention problem we are referring to the failure of captains,
1st lieutenants, and 2nd lieutenants to seek and accept permanent,
regular appointments in suffioient numbers to fulfill the needs
of the permanant, regular structure of the Marine Oorps officer
corps.
These three ranks form what we shall oall the prime
promotion b?se (PPB) whioh, for our purposes, is the lowest
grouping of permanent, regular officers eligible for promotion
from whloh all other groupings of permanent, regular officers
flow (upward), this selection of a PPB is made on the assumption
that we cannot be certain that an officer has beoome a careerist
until he has completed his eighth to tenth year of active
commissioned service. Once he has passed this milestone we can






Promotions within the Marine Oorps are basically internal.
They result from the recommendations of a promotion board, which
are endorsed by the Oomaandant of the Marine Oorps, and approved by
the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and the
President of the United States. In its action the promotion board
considers a specifically designated number of officers, from the
officers precedence list (lineal list), and from this group selects
a specifically authorized number for promotion. This number is
generally smaller than the number considered, thus forcing a
degree of attrition in the promotion process, with attrition
becoming more severe as selections involve the more senior officer
ranks. In practice, the officers considered are presently serving
in the rank Immediately junior to that for which they are competing],
Whatever the rank this group of officers constitutes a promotion
base which can be traced back to the PPBf since all of the
officers considered were once members of the PPB.
In theory, each promotion base, which is senior to the
PPB, represents a purification of that base. The degree of
purification depends upon the relative seniority of the promotion
base considered. For example, officers selected for promotion to
major from within the PPB represent, in relation to the number
considered, the most qualified of those eligible, 'iilien this
group of officers, as members of a promotion base made up of
majors, are considered for selection for promotion to lieutenant
colonel forced attrition will again generate purification and
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only the most qualified sill he select This procedure will
continue until, ultimately, the most qualified are selected for
promotion to general officer.
Prom this it can be concluded that the quality of officer
in an. only as good as the highest quality in the
promo t ase from which he was selected. This is almost
axiomatic* Therefore, if we Insure that a promotion base contains
the h. ft quality of officers attainable, the next higher rank,
after promotion, will reflect this quality.
It follows then that an improvement in the quality of the
PPB will be realized in improved, succeeding, senior promotion
bases.
A good PPB can be described in many ways. For our
purposes it is one which is staffed by a large number of career
motivated, professional, permanent, regular officers, who have
demonstrated their ability through actual performance of duty.
The value of this PPB will be affected by a lessening or
intensification in degree of either number or quality.
we will concern ourselves primarily with the problem of
numbers, that is, the requirement that the Marine Oorps retain
in the PPB a large number of career motivated, professional,
permanent, regular officers. Since the authorized strength of
the Marine Oorps is subject to ohauge we will not attempt to
define an exact number except to say that it should be
sufficiently large so as to enable a promotion board truly to
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select, from a group of officers eligible for promotion, a
smaller group representing those most qualified, A base ooaposed
of such a number would lessen the possibility of selection of
marginally qualified officers who, if the base were appreciably
smaller , might be selected because of a need to promote a
specific number to fill specific vacancies.
Ke have described a good PPB as one which is staffed with
a large number of permanent, regular officers, when we examine
the Marine Corps PPB we recognize that it is staffed also with
a large number of reserve officers. It is recognized that
reserve officers must be trained in sufficient numbers to provide
a mobilization base in case of armed oonflict. It is further
recognized fulfillment of this requirement /ill require a
number of t:iese reserve officers to be on active duty in the PPB.
For this reason, in this study, when we speak of reserve officers
weakening the PPB we do not refer to those who are serving on
active duty in fulfillment of mobilization base requirements.
Such reserve officers are usually serving only their minimum
active duty requirement and are serving In the ranks of 2d
lieutenant t lieutenant. With respect to those reserve
officers who are serving beyond this requirement it may be said
that the PPB is weakened *hen their numbers Increase and
strengthened when their numbers decrease. Such officers are




Figures 3 and 3A provide a picture of the distribution
of officers, aotual and desired, for fiscal years I960, 1961 and
1962, These figures include both regular officers and reserve
officers on active duty. As can be seen, there was little
difference, overall, between the desired number and actual numbers
of officers for that I year period. The rank of 2d lieutenant
does show shortages but there was an overage in numbers in the
PPB overall. It must also be noted that there was an overage in
the total officer structure for two of the three years cited and
that the percentage of the total of all officers actually taken
up by the PPB was smaller than the percentage of the total cf all
officers desired to be taken up by PPB.
looking deeper, we discover that a large percentage of
the 2?B was made up of reserve officers and that this percentage
increased from FX I960 to FY 1962, See Figure 4. This could be
an indication that the prime promotion base may be weakening
th respect to the presence of career motivated officers who
desire regular, permanent ooiimissions.
Further, Figure 5 indicates that an increase of 500
officers (total) in the Marine dorps from FY 1961 to FY 1962
saw an increase of 1222 reserve officers on active duty and a
decrease of 374 permanent r ..- officers in the PPB.
Additionally between 96$ and 97% of all reserve officers on
active duty were then serving in the PP. fhis is further







































aFlles of 0*1 Division (Officer Plans and Statistics)
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC).
Figure 3
DISTRIBUTION OF OFFICERS*










esiredA Jtuail esired Actual X)
Total Marine Corps 100 100 100 100 100 100
Captains 28 28 26 26 25 26
1st lieutenants 23 26 26 28 24 26
2d lieutenants 16 14 15 13 14 14
aFlles of 0-1 Division (Officer Plans and
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It is no disparagement of reserve officers to point out
the weakening effect of their increased numbers in the PPB.
the concern in this matter does not stem from any question of the
qualification of reserve officers, but from the fact that the
permanent regular officer structure, which rests on this base,
is thereby being limited to an increasingly smaller group of
officers from which to select. Should this trend continue it
could result in the elimination of the system of selectivity
through creating an insufficiency of permanent, regular offioers,
with respect to filling billet vacancies, to enable a selection.
The extreme would be automatic promotions with complete
elimination of competition.
The question could now be raised as to why all this
concern for selectivity. Krhy is there a need to select the most
qualified? Is it not sufficient to promote, by seniority,
those officers who were so carefully screened on their entry into
the Marine Corps? If there arose a need for a larger number of
offioers than the regular officer corps could provide, could not
reserve officers provide continuing assistance in the form of
active duty officers?





Harvey Mansfield and Harold Stein described the career
officer of the 1930' s as follows:
Career officers for their part, were a fairly-
closed group. They were brought up to think of
themselves as apolitical and seldom voted or qualified
themselves to vote, even in the relatively few states
with practicable absentee voting laws, or give much
attention to looal civic affairs. It was common for
the sons of officers to secure appointments to tfest
Point or the Naval Academy, to follow their father's
career. Service codes inculcated a slight distaste
for the money making goals of businessmen—which did
not extend, however, to the top levels of finance and
industry—and service traditions took a generally
aristocratic view of society and a conservative view
of domestic political and social Issues, though the
officers themselves held no elite status in oivil
society. Service careers were simply outside the main
currents of American life. 1
Further, they described the position of the military
establishment, in this period of government spending, as being
responsible for 17. 5% of the total government outlay:
The entire outlay in the military establishment
amounted to no more than #700 million out of total
expenditures of $4 billion for FY 1930. 2
^Millis, Walter, with Harvey Mansfield and Harold Stein,






This attitude and this posture were outgrowths of the
American people's historioal distrust of large standing armies
and of the fear of the poteatial threat of military involvement
in politics, Two of our most respected presidents voiced this
distrust in speeches to the American people given over 150 years
apart. George Washington warned that the United States should
• . avoid the necessity of those overgrown military
establishments, which, under any form of government,
are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be
regarded as particularly hostile to republican
liberty. 1
Dwight D. Slsenhower, on 17 January 1961, brought
Washington's warning up to date.
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the
United States had no armaments industry; American
makers of plowshares could, with time and as required,
make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk
emergency improvisation of national defense; we have
been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry
of vast proportions. Added to this, 5.5 million men
and women are directly engaged in the defense
establishment. Ws annually spend on military security
alone more than the net income of all United States
corporations.
This conjunction of an immense military establish-
ment and a large arms industry is new In the American
experience. The total influence—economic, politioal,
even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse,
every office of the Federal Government. We recognize
the imperative need for this development. Yet we must
not fail to comprehend its grave Implications. Our toil,
resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very
structure of our society.
In the councils of Government, we must guard against
the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought
or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The
potential for the disastrous rise of misplaoed power
exists and will persist.
J-George D. Patterson, III, "Should Politics be Taboo?,"
United States ffaval Instlture Proceedings . September, 1962, p. 40.
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We must never let the weight of this combination
endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We
should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so
that security and liberty may prosper together. 1
Ihe end of World War II, however
,
presented a changed
world, one in which the position of the military and the
requirements which must be placed upon it were also changed.
George Fielding iaiot described this period as one of
• . . paradox: a period in which we work for peaoe,
with better prospects of attaining it than before
yet a period in which we must maintain greater and
more Immediately ready armaments than ever before.
In evaluating the military man who existed prior to World
War II, and who provided the leadership during World War II, if
we subscribe to the opinion of Walter Millie that this war showed
that the doctrine of pure war, to which military men subscribed
up to that time, proved unfit when tested, then we must agree
that military men must be trained to a higher capacity than that
which simply produces a battle won. Bather, he must be trained
to a capacity which produces a battle won in such a manner as to
provide for fulfillment of the overall political desires of his
country.
xIbld .. p. 41.
2George Fielding iaiot, Ihe Strength we Heed . (New lork:
The Viking Press, 1946), p. 9.
3Millis, p. 114.
4Ibld .. p. 129.
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If we do not subscribe to this thought we must at least
agree to the existence of a post World War II necessity for a
large standing military establishment, equipped and trained to
protect the interests of the United States in the most efficient
manner possible* No longer, as General Sisenhower pointed out,
oan we "risk emergency improvisation of national defense."*
But,where does the young officer, the 2d lieutenant, 1st
lieutenant, and captain fit into this changed ploture?
Charles HIton and Roland McKean write:
In an all-out thermonuclear war the superior economic
war potential of the United States is important only to
the extent that it has been effectively diverted to
security purposes before a war starts. 2
Part of this potential is the manpower which William
Kintner described as follows:
Perhaps the most vital element in a defense
;anization is the manpower within it. • • •
alleles, plans and weapons are meaningless when
separated from the human beings who develop and
utilize theau*
Manpower must be utilized, intelligently and efficiently,
and, within the military, the planners and users of manpower
today are the military leaders who were yesterday's 2d
lieutenants, 1st lieutenants and captains. Tomorrow's leaders
^Patterson, p. 41.
20harles J. aitch and Eoland S. I-iciLean, Zhe economics of
Defense in the Nuclear Age . (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1961), p. 15*
^William R. Kintner, Forging a New Sword . (New Tork:
Harper Brothers, 1958), p. 21.
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are today serving In these Junior ranks and future leaders are
civilians today being motivated, or not motivated as the oase
may he, toward a military career.
Ihe attitude of the American people seems to have changed
ards the threat of a large, standing military establishment,
Ihis is evidenced by the existsnoe of one for over twelve years,
with no decisive attempt having been made to reduce it to pre*
World Tar II lavels. This may be due to a subjugation of the
innate distrust, dascrlbed abov3, to a greater force, the need
to face the Oommunlst threat from a position of strength, or it
may be an awareness, brought out by World War II, that a large
military establishment does not, in faot, pose a threat to our
democratic freedoms.*
vfever it has come about, the American people now have,
and accept a military establishment which proposes to spend, in
FY 1964, $51 billion, which constitutes 524 of the total
2
executive budget.
thin this changed world and this changed attitude the
young officer has a position as a future leader. John W.
Masland and Lawrence Radway describe his role as follows:
To attain national security objectives without
resort to war requires a national strategy in which
the disposition of military forces is integrated with
political bargaining, policy statements, alliance,
illis, p. 66.
xecutive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget,
line Budget In Srlef . Fiscal rear 1964 . (Washington, 2. 0.: 0. S.
Oovernment Printing Office), pp. 59-60.
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foreign economic policy, propaganda, and any and all
measures that may foster the growth of friendly
factions within foreign governments, • . . The role
of the military officer of tomorrow would be even less
conventional than the role he has played in the recent
past. 1
iter Millis described the effect of the change in the
armed services.
It was in the early 1950' s that the Army, Navy,
and Air Force began to realize the enormity of the
obligations that were being thrust upon them. They
had to produce not simply competent combat commanders
and staff specialists in logistics, but a whole corps
of military statesmen, oapable of filling the
innumerable politico-military staff positions in the
Pentagon, in the tf. ^r., in NATO, in the trust
territories, in the iikkQ groups which were yawning
after and devouring politically aware military
personnel. 2
Prom all this it is clear that the career military officer
must meet requirements today which are formidable and which have
rarely, if ever, been laid upon his predecessors. But, who or
what is this career military officer who must meet these
requirements?
Generally, the oareer military officer, referred to in
this paper also as a regular officer or a permanent, regular
officer. Is considered to be a professional. Samuel Huntington
describes the modern officer corps as a professional body,
characterized by expertise, responsibility, and oorporateness,
*Jt „ island and Lawrence I. oldlers and
f
oholars: Military Education and National Policy . (Princeton:




and the military officer as a professional man. 1 Fie amplifies
this description, stating that the offioer is a professional in
the sense of one who pursues a "higher calling'1 in the service
of society.
^rris Janowita updated Huntington's comments and
described an offioer as one who must be sensitised
... to political and social consequences of military
action, ... In order for the military manager of the
future to operate effectively in foreign areas, many
years of experience—perhaps 10 to 15 years—are
required. 2
From these comments it appears that the professional
officer is one who must work at his profession full time; one who
sees his profession as a way of life more than a Job; and, one
who must be continually educated through rotation among various
assignments and duties as well as through formal, professional
education, to increase his qualification within his profession.
This definition automatically excludes the reserve
officer whose primary mission is to become as qualified as
possible to serve on active duty should that requirement arise.
He is a part*time professional who has devotedly given of his
time to be prepared "when needed" but who, through his own
preference or for some other reason, doss not J.3sire or Is not
^Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the Sta te,
(Cambridge, Mass.: ihe Belknap rress of Harvard University -Tees,
1957), P. 7.
orris Janowltz, roe Professional ^oldler . (Illinois:
The Free Press of Jlenco, i960), p. 26.
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qualified to serve full time as a permanent, regular officer.
Consequently, he is limited in expertise by not being Involved
in full time professional training and experience j in
responsibility by not being full responsive to the same influences
which lot the permanent regular officer; and in oorporateness
\iy not being a full time m*nber of the professional body, the
officer corps.
le our history is replete with war after war being
won by Its citizen soldiers, among whom reserves stand in the
forefront, their purpose is to serve In time of need and not as
permanent regular members of the regular officer structure. If
It were otherwise they would cease to be reserves.
thus we see that reserve officers do not serve the needs
of the modern military profession, even though on active duty.
Altho; performing essential duties, they are not the
source from which senior, regular officers are selected; and
these senior, regular officers are the intended users of the
resource manpower.
ever, reserve officers have historically served as a
source of regular officers. Presently this mutation is
aooompli through the medium of augmentation. Thus, within
the P?3, we discover a mutation caused on the one hand by
permanent, regular officers leaving active service and on the
other hand by reserve officers accepting appointments as regular
officers, *e 6 pictures total accessions and total attrition,
within the PPB, by rank, during PX I960, 1961, and 1962.
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aFlles of the G-l (Statistics) Division, HQ
Figure 6
figure 7 shows augmentation, by rank, during that same period.
.
-us we have the problem better defined, Seduced to its
simplest terms, we may say that the quality of our future Marine
Corps leaders depends upon the quality of the PPB from which they
will be initially selected. Further, any failure to procure a
sufficient number of officers adequately to staff this PPB will
very possibly reduce the quality of these future leaders*
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aFiles Of G-l (Statistics) Division, HQMO.
Figure 7
Presently, it would appear that we are not proouring sufficient
permanent, regular officers adequately to staff this ?PB» In this
we could be endangering the future superior quality of Marine
Oorps leaders and will continue to do so until we build up an
adequate PP3.
This is the problem, and these are the ramifications. But
let us consider how many other resources we have invested in these
officers who are failing to remain and what this means to the
Marine Oorps in terms of investment lost. How much does it cost
to procure and train these future leaders to meet the requirements




HP the purposes or this study the oost of procuring
officers inoiudes all Identifiable oosts incident to the
procurement process and the training of applicants, including
cadets, up to the time when they accept commissions in the
United 3tat93 Marine Corps or the United States Marine Corps
Reserve. The scope of this stud/ is not sufficiently broad to
allow for the detailed research necessary to unearth all costs
incurred in the procurement of officers. Therefore, what follow
may be considered merely as representative minimum 003ts. Xhese
costs were derived through logical inference as well as from
recorded history. Additionally, detailed costing has been
limited to those sources of officer accessions which the author
considers as prime sources—those which produced approximately
75* of total officer accessions in the ten years from fiscal
year 1952 to fiscal year 1962.
Programs leading to a commission as a 2d lieutenant have
already hQen oosted both as to procurement ^nd as to training.




1* The Naval Academy. The most currently estimated cost
of procurement and training of a midshipman is $28, 500. 1 This
cost includes all expenditures at the Saval Academy identified as
being applicable to midshipman maintenance and training.
2. The Haval Reserve Officer Training Oorps. The, Naval
Reserve Officer Training Oorps graduates regular and reserve
office ; different costs. A regular 3&0T0 accession costs
approximately $9*100; a reserve SRQTO accession, $3*3 This
cost includes all expenditures made under budget items Haval
Personnel (Operations and Haintenance), Reserve Personnel Navy,
Military Pay Navy, and Military Pay Marine Oorps, as well as the
costs of civilian staff overhead administrative upkeep, testing,
uniforms, books, instructional equipment, and the like.
3* Havy Bnlisted Scientific Education Program (IBSIP).
The average cost of a graduate of this program for fiscal year 1962
was |14,49<>. This cost includes tuition, books, and the pay and
allowances of the marine enrolled in the program.
^-Interview with Commander Robert H. Bwing, USJ7, Bureau of
Saval Personnel, ilaroh, 1963*
^Interview with Mr. Henry K. Moulthrop, Bureau o" :al
Personnel, March, 1963.
^Files of the Fiscal Division, Headquarters United 3tates




In considering the remaining programs* we discover that
applicants for the platoon leader's class (PLC), the marine
aviation cadet program (HARSAD), the officer candidate oourse
(000), and the woman 1 8 officer candidate course (,.000) are
generally procured by the same activity, the military personnel
procurement service (officer selection) of the Xarlne Corps.
Limited records make uneconomical any attempt at determin-
ing what percentage of the procurement effort, and therefore what
percentage of procurement cost, is applicable to each program*
Consequently, we will consider all programs as having received
equal attention from the procurement agencies. Based upon this
assumption, Figure 8 lists oosts applicable to the officer
procurement effort for fiscal year 1962.
During fiscal year 1962, the Marine Corps accepted 4900
PLC, OCC, MAEOAD, and J 000 applications at a cost of $277.09 per
application. However, this figure represents a "gross" and not
a "net" cost. Since our purpose is to define procurement costs
as closely as possible, we must consider the cost of procurement
not in terms of applications accepted but in terms of applicants
commissioned.
Pisure 9 is a study of estimated attrition within the
platoon leader's class from time of enrollment to time of
commissioning, the attrition may have been voluntary, on the part
of the applicant, or it may have been the result of the applicant'
failure to qualify for any one of many reasons.
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OOSTS IN0ID3FT TO THS PHOOUREaSHT 0? APPLICANTS FOR I
PLO, 000, £000, AND HARCAD, FI30AL I3AR 1962a
Activity Total Funds Expended
by Activity (0)
Project 42| Operations and Maintenance
Project edia
Pay and allowances (estimated) of personnel
assigned to Officer Seleotion Teams ."
214,437.00
150,000.00


















aFiles of the Military Personnel Procurement 3ranoh,
Personnel Department, HQMO.
^See Appendix 3. For purposes
considered that no officer had former
officers are married; one-half of the
all enlisted men are drawing standard
all enlisted men have been issued the
supplementary allowance; all enlisted
rations in kind not available; and no
awarded proficiency pay.
of this study It is
enlisted servioe; all
enlisted men are married;
maintenance allowance;
small blue uniform
men are subsisting with
enlisted man has been
c Includes one marine aviator.
dIncludes four marine aviators.
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aThls figure was not economically available for all
years . tfhat Is shown here is estimated from a known average
attrition of 14$ in the program between enrollment and initial
orders to summer training,
©Provided from the records of the Reserve Officer
Oandidat fcion of the Military Personnel Procurement 3ranoh,
Headquarters U. B« H. 0.
°Oode MU, Headquarters lf# 3. M« 0., "accessions to
Officer Strength, Fiscal Years 1952-1962."





Consequently It woj-ld appear that If the average
attrition shown In figure 9 Is representative of PLO attrition
overall, of the 2454 PLO applicants procured in FY 1962, only
614 (25^) will be commissioned, and that a more realistic
proeu. lost per applicant in their case tfould be $1107.46
and not 7277.09. This is especially so when we consider that the
only test of any effort is in the results It produces.
A similar situation exists with respect to the officer
candidate course. Attrition within the officer candidate course,
from enrollment to commissioning, is estimated at 40$, 15# prior
to training and 25# In training. 1 This adjusts the estimated
acquisition cost per officer candidate commissioned to $461,82.
The remaining overall acquisition cost applicable to all
candidates commissioned Is the cost of administering the overall
officer selection program at Headquarters Marin© Oorps. The
only c illy identifiable in this regard are pay oosts.
Therefore, Figure 10 is a recapitulation of the personnel, by
military rank, civilian government service grade, and pay
presently employed solely in officer procurement matters at
Headquarters Marine Corps level, Military pay and allowances are
as estimated in Figure 10, OIvll pay is estimated on the basis
that all personnel are serving in grade 3 of the applicable
governs) ?rvice rating. Figure 11 shows the average number of
^Interview vith Ma^or Parcell, Reserve Officer Candidate
Section, Military Personnel Procurement Branch, ftQMO.
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a?ersonnel Interview with representatives of the Military
Personnel Procurement Branch, HQMO.
bAll military personnel are considered to be married, not
drawing incentive or proficiency pay, subsisting where rations in
kind are available, and drawing the standard clothing and
maintenance allowance.
c Estimated civilian pay costs are based on Headquarters,
U. 3. M. 0., "Civilian Employees Information Bulletin," Vol. XV,


























aOode DPH, Headquarters U, S. M. 0., "Accessions to




total officer accessions from fiscal year 1956 to fiscal year 196;
Proa these it can be seen that, if Figure 10 can be
considered as representative of the numbers and ranks of personnel
employed at Headquarters, U« S. Marine Oorps in officer
procurement, their salaries prorated over the average number of
officers procured sinoe FX 1956 is §77.01 per officer.
To determine a representative cost of training the
candidates for commissioning we must allocate to these candidates
those identifiable direct and indirect costs incurred at Marine
Oorps Schools, Quantlco, Virginia, As a base for this
calculation we will use expenditures applicable to FY 1963>
Incurred as of .February, 1963» and estimated for the remainder of
the year (in the light of the budget), tfe will also use personnel
training figures for fiscal year 1963, actual as of February,
1963, and as planned for the remainder of the year.
Figure 12, extracted from Appendix I, shows the total of
student man years of instruction conducted and expected to be
conducted in the Training and Test Regiment at Quantioo in FY 1962
The total effort of this regiment is directed at precommlssioning
training.
A total of |81,000 is allooated directly to Training and
Teat Regiment by the Commandant, Marine Oorps Schools, Quantlco
for expenditure in connection with precommiasionlng training.
This figure reduces to approximately $115.24 per student man year
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TAB0MTION OF STUDENT MAN TBJLRS OF INSTRUCTION
TRAIHDIG AND T . .&IM3HI
QUANTIGO, VIHCHHIA
PIT 1963a
Course Humber of Students
Attending


















Dlst summer training period.




of instruction or $8.60 per PLC Junior, §3.35 per PLO senior,
#12.94 per NHQTC student and $23.80 per officer oandidate course
member.
In addition to this cost there are certain overhead costs,
which must be allocated among the varying courses, and which
total 126,134,112 or 111,955.55 per student man year of
instruction. This further may be reduced to a cost of $892.18
per SU) junior, 1866.12 for each PLO senior, 32469.62 for each
000 member and $1342.6? for each NROTG student. The procedure
used in costing training is treated in aore detail in Chapter V.
Because of the attrition already noted above this cost
is further reflnable. Utilizing Figure 9 as a basis for
computation, and utilizing the strength figures contained in
Figure 12, we are able to refine the costs of PLO officer
accessions as shown in Figure 13. Of the 3200 PLC's initially
ordered to training, 928 will be commissioned.* In like manner,
since an estimated 25$ of the officer's candidate class ordered
to training will not be commissioned, the cost of each candidate
commissioned may be further refined. (See Figure 13).
In summary, it appears that a good, representative,
minimum cost for each officer commissioned in the Marine Oorps or
Marine Oorps Reserve, by identified method through which he was
selected and trained, would be as shown in Figure 14. Again,
attention is invited to the fact that these costs are based on
expenditures made during different periods of time which only
^Interview with representatives of the Reserve Officer




3D QOSfS FOR PLC'S AHD 00C LIOH2 0.
ATURXHOW (BASED 03 OOSt: . IN yiCHJRS 12
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aInoludes 1140.43 clothing allowance cost and travel oosts
at the rate' of $83.22 (one way).





relate to each other in that they are representative of costs
incurred In acquiring a 2d lieutenant. Attention is also invi-
to the fact that PLO and 000 costs are understated in that they
do not include the pay and allowances of the member students




Of the many costs incurred in preparing an officer for his
first duty, those incurred in training are by far the most
substantial. In this chapter we will consider these costs in some
detail.
The major Marine officer training effort is conducted at
Marine Corps Schools, Quantlco, Virginia. In fact, it may be said
that the entire effort of this activity is devoted to the
instruction of students.
In determining the costs applicable to the training of
those officers in whom we are most interested, 2d lieutenants who
have not as yet reported to their first duty station after
training, we must make certain assumptions. These are:
1. That there is a causal connection between all Marine
and Naval activities at Quantlco, Virginia and the training of
Marine Oorps and other U. 3. military and allied students. For
example, the Naval Hospital at Quantlco exists to service the
military who are at Quantlco serving as military instructors,




or as students. The same causal connection may be drawn for the
Air facility at Quantloo.
There may be a objection to this assumption to the extent
that the landing force development center, Marine Corps Schools
and the support provided it by certain units of the air facility
are not actively engaged in the instruction of students. Since
the isolation of the direct and overhead costs attributable to
the development center activity would be uneconomical in terms
of the costs of obtaining it, it is oonsidered that the costs of
operating these activities may be included in this study.
2. That the entire effort of Marine dorps Schools and
its supporting activities, the Marine Corps Air Facility and the
If. 3. Naval Hospital, may be reduced equally to total numbers of
student years of instruction or to total dollars expended. Thus,
Total Dollars Expended m Total Number of Student Tears
of Instruction
3. That Marine dorps and Navy stock fund transactions
should be excluded from these cost figures in order to reduce any
distortion which may arise from considering the transactions of a
revolving fund.
4. That reimbursables In Project 22 and Project 23 t
should be included In the cost figures since they represent
receipts offsetting certain expenditures under these projects and
consequently provide funds which, in turn, may be expended.
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5« Ihat civilian and military payroll totals for fiscal
year 1962, provide an adequate basis for estimating representative
pay costs at Quantico.
6. That the courses established to conduct the training
of 2d lieutenants prior to their assignment to their first duty
station (other than duty under instruction at Quantlco) train
only 2d lieutenants. Consequently, the frequency with which these
courses are used to train officers of other ranks is of such
minor incidence as to not appreciably affect ratios and totals
based on the assumption that the total student input is in the
rank of 2d lieutenant.
7. That the direct training assistance contribution made
by the Marine Corps Educational Center to courses other than
those conduoted within that center are not of sufficient magnitude
as to warrant the expense of costing them out.
In support of Marine Corps Schools the (J. S« Naval
Hospital, Quantico, Virginia expends approximately f850, 000 under
two Navy operations and maintenance allotments, covering two
budget projects, under two separate Navy bureaus.
Xhe Marine Corps Air Station, Quantico, Virginia
administers two major allotments, Operations and Maintenance Navy
leased on fisoal year 1962 data (approximate) provided
by a representative of the Comptroller's Office, Marine Corps
Schools, Quantico, Virginia, March 1963*
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and Operations and Maintenance Marine Corps, covering twenty-four
various budget projects, at a cost of approximately $1,900,000.
This figure includes $200,000 in reimbursables. 1
Marine Corps Schools administer two Operations and
Maintenance, Marine Corps allotments, covering eight budget
projects, a subsistence in kind allotment, and several minor
projects, at a cost of approximately $7,104,215. Figure 15 gives
a detailed description of these expenditure authorizations,
Military salaries, at all facilities at Quantlco, in
fiscal year 1962, were approximately #19,209,522. Of this figure,
for our purposes, we will consider 50^, or 19, 604,761 as
representative of the salaries of the military, other than
students, stationed at Quantico. Although it is estimated that
this amount constitutes an understatement of military salaries
expense, applicable as overhead costs, it is considered that it
serves our purpose of establishing a minimum representative cost.
Civilian salaries for that same period '.fere approximately
#6,895, 350. 2
Thus a total of approximately 026,554,326 can be expected
to be expended either directly or indirectly on the training of
students at Marine Corps Schools during fiscal year 196?.
1 Ibld .
*The pay and allowance totals were provided by the
Disbursing Officer, Marine Corps Schools, whose office pays all
military and civilian employees at Marine Corps Schools, the
U. S. Naval Hospital, and the Marine Corps Air Facility.
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JSXPaJHDITURiS AUTHORIZATIONS MARISS CORPS SCHOOLS
ANIIOO, ViaaiHIA, FISCAL IdAR 1963a
Expenditure Authorization Total Funds Authorized
Project
Project 23
Pro j so t 11
Project
Subsistence iu iUnd
Commandant, ua-rine Corps Schools
Contingency Fund
Marina Corps Reserve Training
Forestry Management























-v C of S Comptroller, Marine Corps Schools, Quantlco,
Virginia, "Financial Plan, FX 1963, Projects 23, 22, 11, 21,"
of 4 Decambsr 1962; and conversations with members of the




To reduce the activity of Marine Oorps Schools to a total
number of student years of Instruction we may employ the
following formula:
Length of course ffumber of students Total student man
{%& Aj^sJ x attending the course * years of instruction.
>peiidix I contains a schedule of total student years of
instruction, conducted or scheduled to be be conducted
Quantlco, by course, in fiscal year 1963. Appendix II is a
graphic portrayal of the training effort at Marine Oorps Schools.
In i are interested in those totals which affect
the training of 2d lieutenants. These totals are contained, for
convenience, in Figure 16. It is interesting to note that
approximately W% of the total student training effort at
Quantlco is directed to the training of 2d lieutenants who have
yet to report to their first duty station in other than a student
status.
To determine what proportion of the total $26,554,326,
is applicable to the training of the 2d lieutenants, in which we
are most interested, we omst first Isolate those direct costs
which are expended on individual oourses and then allocate the
remaining total, the overhead costs, equitably among all the
students.
Figure 17 contains the direct oost structure at Ilarine
Oorps Schools. These costs are applicable to specific training




S0HBDU1B OF COURSES 1ITBHDSD BY 2D LIOTfBNAMTS
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DIR.30T COST STRUCTURE, MRINS CORPS SCHOOLS
FISCAL Y3AR 1963a
Aotivity Direct Cost
Marine Corps Educational Center
Basic School
Ordnance School
Women Detachment (Formal School Training)
Training and Test Regiment













aA of S Comptroller, Marine Corps Schools, Financial




There will be some distortion in the allocation of
overhead costs since teacher and administrative salaries and
other costs have been applied generally as overhead costs whereas
most are applicable to specific courses and activities. However,
these specific costs could not be uncovered economically.
Further, since the amounts in military salaries and allowances
vary considerably from person to person, due to differences in
time In service, marital status, off-base housing, and the like,
the procurement of an accurate figure would require the handling
of each individual pay record Involved. Also the military salary
figures are distorted insofar as they do not include the money
amount of allotments paid to the military but not by the
Disbursing Officer of Marine dorps Schools. 1
To allocate the indirect training costs to the training
effort conducted at Marine Corps Sohools we may use the direct
2
labor hours method. This method is illustrated as follows:
indirect Training Costs for ?f 1963
, indirect training
Total number of student man years cost rate per
of instruction student man year of
Instruction
training cost rate per student man year of instruction X
the number of student man years of instruction in a
specific course a indirect training costs applicable to
that course
Indirect training costs applicable Indirect training
to a specific oourso « costs per individual




^Conversation with the Disbursing Officer, Marine Corps
Schools, March, 1963.
lalph Dale Kennedy and Frederick Charles Kurtz,
Introductory Accounting . (Scranton, Pa.: International Textbook
>any, 1950), p. 611.
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For purposes of simplicity we «*ill consider each course
in /early total and not by the various increments which are
completed at different times during the flsoal year* thus,
Figure 18 shows how much of the estimated Indirect training costs
at Quantico are applicable to each of the students attending
Basic Course, Communication Officer Orientation Course, and
Artillary Officer Orientation Course* Figure 19 shows the direct
oosto, per student, applicable to the same courses.
Thus we have a clearer picture of the investment we have
in a new officer in terms of minimum costs necessary to prepare
him to assume his duties as a commissioned officer responsible
for a task to be accomplished.
ssfzuifAS ifDiaasf miffiHa 00323 applioablj to omtkiM owio ,,

























iSSIIMAXSD DIRSOT COSTS Pj3R OFFICER SJIJD3HT ATTENDING
basic ooaass, ariillsrx officer orijshia-hoh
COURSE, AND COMMUNICATION OFFICER COURS






















^Includes the Communication Officer Orientation Course,
bDoes not include internal overhead costs within the
Marine Corps Sdueational Center of which this course is a part,





tfp to this time baoausa of the limited scope of this
study we have purposely not included any discussion of aviation
officer training costs. However, Appendix IV contains costs in
this regard and it would be well to introduce them now when we
are considering a representative total officer investment.
Figure 20 lists representative costs for the acquiring
and training of specific types of officers. It is emphasized
that these costs rapresent an investment on which no return has
yet been exacted, a minimum investment, Nor does this investment
includa costs inourred in training a ground offioer for specific
duties in other than the Infantry, 3uoh additional costs may be
incurred prior to the officer's reporting to his first duty
station but, except for those incurred at Quantico, which are
contained In Figures 18 and 19, they were not economically
obtainable.
How, consider manpower as a resource which must be
amortized over the period of Its useful life if we are to recover
our investment In It, Further, consider that the estimated
useful life of a permanent, regular officer, as a part of the
general classification manpower, Is twenty years and that the
amortization rate for these officers, per year, may be obtained
by dividing twenty Into the total cost of acquiring and training
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With these considerations in mind, let us examine the
Marine Corps' prime sources of regular officer input to determine
what investment, if any, has been lost in any failure to retain
officers obtained from these sources*
The prime sources of regular officer input are the Maval
Academy and the 33ROXO (regular) program. These two sources
provided an average of 81$ of all regular officer accessions
from 1954 to 1959. (See Figure 21). Since these officers have
devoted four years of formalized military study, at government
expense, to prepare for military service it is considered that,
of all who enter the military life, they are most predisposed
toward a military career.
A permanent regular ground officer, from one of these
sources, who receives no more formal military education, after
commissioning, than basic school, amortizes at a yearly rate of
11,677*55, if he was obtained from the Naval Academy, and 1774.68,
if he was commissioned through the NROTQ Program.
If then, we consider each year, of the twenty years not
served, as representing a lost investment, we discover that, in
this one area of retention alone, provided that all these offioers
could have been retained the full twenty years and based on the
preceding oost figures, we have lost a minimum total Investment
of ^6,628, 175.81, during the period from 1954 through 1959. (See
Figure 22.) This loss is understated in that it does not include
aviation attrition, which would represent approximately two to
five times the amortization cost of a ground officer, and it does
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A0Q33SI0HS TO 0FFIG3R STRENGTH,
OHIfBD ST. JORPS.














1954 441*> 358 31
1955 356 303 35
1956 377 324 86
1957 326 250 77
1958 337 246 73
1959 354 272 77
a0ode DPH, "Accessions to Officer Strength, Ft 1952-1962.
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not include the cost of acquiring and training a replacement for
the lost officer.
That we liave a regular officer retention problem, based
on the preceding assumptions and conclusions, is evident. That
this retention problem is costing money in terms of investment
lost is also evident.
iat has been shown here is but a small part of the
problem and some representative cost figures which help to
explain the problem in financial terms. But, what is the




Many studies and many individuals have devoted time and
effort to the general problem of officer retention. Much has been
written about retention in publications ranging from military
periodicals to the Harvard Business Heview.
Many reasons have been offered to explain this retention
failure. Some have said that it is the result of the poor public
image of the military man; others that it is caused by poor
military pay; and still others that it is because of the threat
of prolonged family separations.
In the opinion of the author there is a grain of truth in
all these explanations. But, a grain Is insufficient for solution
of the problem. We require more.
Of two independent studies conducted in the recent past,
both concerning various aspects of the retention problem, one
discovered that a married officer became a careerist if his wife
is in favor of his remaining in the military, and, therefore,
^William H. Bines, "A Call to Arms . . . for Peace,"




recommended that the Department of Defense place emphasis on
actions to improve family living conditions and on public
relations to increase the prestige of the military service. It
further recommended that additional family quarters be provided
to reduce the number of family separations caused by the lack
of such quarters.
The same study later reported that within the Army, Navy
and Air Force a sampling of officers, undecided as to whether to
adopt a servloe career, rated as the four most important
environmental factors which would sway them in favor of a career,
sufficient pay and allowances, improved promotional opportunity,
more opportunity to live with their families, and the opportunity
to change duty assignments. These same officers reported that
the lack of or lessening in degree of any of these factors would
most likely induce undecided officers to leave the service.
The other study, conducted at the Navy Management School,
U. 3. tfaval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, uncover-
some interesting facts in relation to the Marine Corps officer
retention problem. This study was limited to officers from the
12th Marine Corps Reserve and Reoruitment District (including the
states of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Utah and Arizona). A small sample of officers, who had been




for their leaving the military service. Of the seventy-seven
officers questioned, 85# responded. The following conclusions
were drawn from the replies.
a. Ihe major reasons which prompted these officers to
leave the service were:
1. A lack of opportunity to develop and exercise
abilities within capabilities.
2. Promotion based on seniority and not ability and
demonstrated initiative.
3. Lack of opportunity to obtain duty assignments
desired or needed for career planning.
4. Family hardships and prolonged family separations.
5. The possibility of being seleoted out of the
Marine Corps before meeting retirement requirements.
It inclination on the part of the respondent to
assume a military career.
b. Other important considerations were:
1. Pay was not an important consideration in
swaying these officers to leave.
2. Fringe benefits were not Important considerations.
3. Approximately half of the respondents had no
intention of making the military a career at the time they
entered active duty.
ijor James R. Gallman, et. al., MA Study of the Problem
of detention of Junior Officers of the U. S. Navy, the U. 3.
Marine Corps, and the U. 3. Coast Guard," A research paper
presented to the faculty of the Navy Management School, U. S.
Ifavy Postgraduate School, May, 1961.
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The conclusions of these two studies appear at odds
with each other. The first study, which was much broader in
scope and execution than was the second, may be considered as
the mora valid of the two and its conclusions the more sound.
It would be difficult to support an opinion contrary to this.
3ut, the second study, limited and narrow as it is,
concerned itself specifically with Marine Corps officers while
the first queried officers from all services. In this is the
key to the solution of the Marine Oorps retention problem.
individual is drafted into service as a Marine Oorps
officer. All Marine Oorps officer accessions are voluntary.
Consequently, a Marine Oorps officer may be said to differ froL
all other officers in that his mental processes, desires,
outlook, or the like, led him to decide on the Marine Oorps as
his chosen branch of service rather than one of the other
branches. Therefore, since different forces, than those which
affected men who sought commissions as officers in other
services, appeared to have swayed the Marine Oorps officer, it
can be said that what may be career motivational to him is not
necessarily what Is career motivational to members of other
services. If then, we are truly to study the retention problem
within the Marine Oorps, we must do it by studying the Marine
Corps officer to determine what motivates hlai to seek or not
seek a military career.
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th this in mind the author discovered no Marine Corps
sponsored survey, investigation, or study which actually
queried a representative sample of Marine Jorps officers to
determine what made them decide to enter the Marine Corps,
seek arine Corps as a career, or to leave the Marine Corps,
Nor is there evidence that one had ever been Initiated.
?rom this it may be concluded that *e, as Marines, may
think we know why officers do not seek military careers but we
cannot be sure *e know . Our conclusions can only be based on
personal, limited experience and not on scientific study, and, as
such, c?n be considered to be limited in validity.
rr these reasons, and because the limited scope of this
study does not allow a sclentifio sampling of officers in this
regard, the author is incapable of offering a valid solution to
the Marine Corps officer retention problem. Nor does he think
such can become available until detailed research, conducted in
a scientific manner within the Marine Corps, provides facts from
which to draw conclusions.
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(1st increment) .0164 40 .66
(2nd increment) .0767 40 3.07
3. Counter Insurgency




(1st increment) .0328 100 3.28
(2nd increment) .0328 50 1.64
Phase II
(1st increment) .0328 100 3.28




5. Senior Oourse .797 127 101.32

















































5-62 .3945 453 178.71
1-63 .4712 429 202.14
2-63 .5315 445 236.52
3-63 .5123 390 199.3
4-63 .4849 278 134.8
5-63 .1013 383 38.80
13. Marine Warrant
Officer Basio
Goarse .2109 150 31.64
U. Special
Indoctrination




(1st increment) .0575 1100 63.25
(2nd Increment) .1123 1000 112.30
(3rd increment) .0575 1100 63.25
Senior
(1st increment) .0575 800 46.00
(2nd increment) .1123 600 67.38
(3rd increment) .0575 800 46.00
16. Uaval Reserve
Officer Training
Course Glass .1123 334 37.51
17. warrant Officer
Candidate
Screening Course .1287 150 19.31
18. Officer Candidate
Course
3l3t .2082 500 104.10
32nd .2054 300 61.62




(Adv) • 126 20 2.52
20, Arzuao. Teoh.
(Saalo)
1-63 .1283 63 8.11
2-63 .137 62 8.49
4-63 .126 62 7.81
21, Arty, ^pns.
Hop. (Adv.) .126 10 1.26
22* Arty. Wpns.
Hep, (Basic)
1-63 .1534 20 3.07
2-63 .1671 20 3.34
3-63 .1562 20 3.12
4-63 .1562 20 3.12
23. Inf. 'pas.
Arra, (Adv.) .126 20 2.52
24. Inf. ,pns.
, (Bcsie)
1-63 .1315 35 4.60
2-63 .1479 35 5.18
3-63 .1238 35 4.51
4-63 .1315 35 4.60
25* Opt. Inst.
1-63 ,1836 15 2.75
2-63 .1918 15 2.88
26. Hep. Shop Heoh.
1~ .3288 15 4.93





16 th .0877 80 7.02
17th .0603 80 4.82
28. V*ata Officer
Basic Course




Leadership Course .0795 27 2.15
Total 2185.94













AUG 62 SEP 62 OCT 62 NOV 62 DEC 62 JAN 63 FEB 63 MAR 63 APR 63
SENIOR COURSE FY-63 120/127 (100) (6) (5) (2) (14)
16 |7 14 21 27
JUNIOR COURSE FY-63 200/200 (175) (5) (3) (0) (17)
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COMMUNICATION OFFICER COURSE 2-63 50/45
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f WPNS REP (Advl Yy')
FY-63 25/10
ARTY WPNS REP (Bond
2-63 25/20 3-63 25/20
INf WPNS ARMOR (Adv]
FY-63 35/20
INF WPNS ARMOR iBoml
1-63 35/35
\2 22 261 |_
% INF WPNS ARMOR |Bo<
WOMEN MARINE
DETACHMENT
OPT INST REP 1-63 16/15 OPT INST REP 2-63 16/15














', ARIT WPNS RtP lBo.0
4 63 25/20
', INF WPNS ARMOR IBcdcl
4-63 35/35




JUL 62 AUG 62 SEP 62 OCT 62 NOV 62 DEC 62 JAN 63 FEB 63 MAR 63 APR 63 MAY 63 JUN t
EH DESIGNATION E/F (G) (H) (I) (J) (K)
A- ALLIED STUDENT REPORTING DATE If SEPARATELY DIRECTED SC
B- REGULAR REPORTING DATE NBCWEC
C- CONVENING DATE CIC
D- GRADUATION DATE JC
E- CLASS CAPACITY COOC
F- TOTAL INPUT RCOC
G-K BREAKDOWN OF INPUTS, IF APPLICABLE, IN ORDER
(USMC) (USA) (USN) (USAF) (ALLIED)
SENIOR COURSE (RESERVE) PHASE ISM
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT COURSE
COUNTER INSURGENCY COURSE
JUNIOR COURSE (RESERVE) PHASE l&ll
COMMUNICATION OFFICER ORIENTATION COURSE
RESERVE COMMUNICATION OFFICER COURSE
AOOC ARTILLERY OFFICER ORIENTATIOI
RAORC RESERVE ARTILLERY OFFICER REF
MWOBC MARINE WARRANT OFFICER BA
SIC SPECIAL INDOCTRINATION COUI
OCC OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE
WOCSC WARRANT OFFICER CANDIDATE
13699 (A) NAVY-MCS QUANTICO.V

F COURSES QUANTICO, VIRGINIA
FY 64
JUL 63 AUG 63
I i I
SEP 63 OCT 63 NOV 63 DEC 63 JAN 64 FEB 64 MAR 64 APR 64 MAY 64
SENIOR COURSE FY-64 120/ ( ) ( ) ( ] ( ) ( |
JUNIOR COURSE FY-64 200/ ( I I ) ( I ( ) ( )




BASIC COURSE 5-63 420/383









BASIC COURSE 2-64 420/
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ARTY WPNS REP |A<M [ ARTY WPNS REP IB
20
u
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2-64 25/
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912
LI REP SHOP MACH
1-64 15/
L^.^-.TT^T^-.' Li".
th WOCC 80/80 17th WOBC80/
^w^^'*^^ g^*"
BASIC COURSE 4-64 420/
5th WOCSC 1000/
36 | 26











REP SHOP MACH 2-64 15/
WMNCOLC
80/
JUL 63 AUG 63 SEP 63 OCT 63 NOV 63 DEC 63 JAN 64 FEB 64 MAR 64 ARP 64 MAY 64 JUN 64
DURSE
>E
PLC PLATOON LEADER CLASS (JR S SRI
NROICC NAVAL RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS CLASS
ROORC RESERVE ORDNANCE OFFICER REFRESHER COURSE
WOCC WOMAN OFFICER CANDIDATE COURSE
WOBC WOMAN OFFICER 8ASIC COURSE
WMNCOLC WOMAN MARINE NCO LEADERSHIP COURSE
E W SNEDEKER
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